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enforce a lien to secure ordinary debt. There are exceptional
attachments in almost every state, but the statutes of all are general
alike in recognition of this lien-creating remedy. Though there are
distinctive features, there is a family likeness.
This prevalent system has no countenance whatever from the
common law. As held over again and again in every state, it is
repugnant to the common law. It is against natural right to give
a creditor a lien of a contingent character, perfect it by judgment,
and sell the debtor's property thereunder, to the exclusion of other
creditors whose judgments may be older than his just because his
lien obtained on his own oath, sworn ex parte, is older than their
judgments. This remedy is not to be confounded with attachment
as distraint'or similar processes. How then can there be power in
the court t6 grant this remedy, unless the conditions of its bestowal
have been observed? If the common-law jurisdiction of a court
over the defendant and the subject-matter of the controversy, renders attaching before judgment incidental in the sense that it is not
an act requiring special authority, our system falls. If a superior
court can obtain special jurisdiction by its own process when the
defendant is not reached so as to be made a party, the same result
is apparent. Safeguards against abuse of the salutary but dangerous remedy would be gone.
RuFus WAPLES.
Ann Arbor, Mich.
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Supreme Court of Illinois.
MAY v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF ATTLEBORO.
Under section 13 of the Illinois act in relation to assignments for the benefit of
creditors, every provision in any assignment that provides for the payment of one
debt in preference to another is void; and, as against creditors, whether resident in
Illinois or a third state, attaching property in Illinois, belonging to a debtor
residing in New York, such an assignment, executed in New York, is void, even
if, by the laws of that state, it is valid, and although the attachment was made with
actual notice of the prior assignment.

APPEAL from Appellate Court, First district.
Attachment.
James S. Norton, for May, assignee, etc., appellant.
Geo. L. ThatcI er, for First Nat. Bank, etc., appellee.
SCOTT, 0. J.-This suit was commenced in attachment by the
First National Bank of Attleboro, Mass., against certain parties
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doing business under the firm name of Halstead, Haines & Co.
The attachment writ was levied upon real estate, alleged to belong
to the attachment debtors, situated in the county of Cook. Judgment was rendered by default against the attachment defefidants
for $5150, with an order for a special execution. Afterwards,
Lewis May, a citizen of New York, where defendants resided, by
his interpleading, claimed to be the owner of the real estate levied
upon, under and by virtue of an assignment by voluntary deed,
made and delivered to him by the insolvent debtors, under and in
conformity to the laws of New York relating to general assignments
by debtors for the benefit of creditors. The deed of assignment
purports to convey and transfer to the interpleading claimant, and
his successors and assigns all and singular, the copartnership and
individual estate of the grantors, real and personal, in trust, with
power to convert the same and apply the proceeds as therein
directed. It provides for the payment of partnership and individual
debts in full, if the estate should be sufficient, otherwise pro rata,
with preferences to employees and certain specified creditors. It is
also averred the deed of assignment was acknowledged July 12th
1884, was duly recorded in the proper office in New York, where
it was made, and was also recorded, July 28th 1884, in the
recorder's office in Cook county in this state, where the lands
involved are situated, and that the plaintiff in attachment had
actual notice of the execution and delivery of the assignment deed
prior to the commencement of this suit. To the plea of the claimant, stating these and other facts of less importance, the court sustained a demurrer, and the claimant not answering, further judgment was entered, dismissing his interplea out of court. The
judgment was afterwards affirmed in the appellate court of the
First district, and the claimant brings the case to this court on his
further appeal.
As the case comes to this court, there can be and is no controversy concerning the material ficts on which the questions of law
arise. The attachment plaintiff is a corporation, existing under the
laws of the state of Massachusetts. The justness of the claim
against the attachment debtors is not called in question. The
defendants in the attachment suit, and the interpleading claimant,
all reside in the state of New York. The assignment deed was
recorded in Cook county, where the lands in controversy are
situated, before this suit was commenced, and the averment, which
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the demurrer, of course, admits, is, the attachment plaintiff had
actual notice of the assignment prior to the commencement of this
suit. Under the facts as admitted, it is a question of law who shall
have the proceeds of the sales of the attachment debtor's landsthe attaching plaintiff, on its claims against the debtors, or the
intervening claimant, for the benefit of the debtor's creditors, to be
distributed in New York under the deed of assignment according
to its provisions. The exact question presented for decision on this
record has not heretofore been passed upon by this court. Cases
involving principles nearly analogous have been the subject of discussion. It must be borne in mind that the intervenor is not a
purchaser for value. He only claims the property in trust for the
benefit of the creditors of his assignors under the provisions of the
deed of assignment, and not otherwise.
In feyer v. Alexander, 108 Ill. 385, the property attached was
claimed by the assignee of the attachment debtors, under a voluntary deed of assignment made in another state, and it was then
ruled the estate "passed by the deed of assignment, subject to such
restrictions as our laws may im-pose."
It was said such a conveyance is only valid by the comity between the states, and the same
comity, in some cases, imposes terms upon the conveyance for the
protection of the inhabitants of the state where the property to be
affected is situated. Accordingly, it was held the property attached
was subject to the claims of the resident attachment creditors. The
principle of that case may be reasonably extended so as to embrace
one feature of the case being considered. it will be noticed the
deed of assignment in this case gives preferences to employees and
certain specified creditors. A statute of this state (sect. 13 of the
act in relation to assignments for the benefit of creditors) makes
every provision in any assignment that provides for the payment of
one debt or liability in preference to another void. The policy of
the law of this state would hardly warrant the courts in lending
their aid to a foreign assignee to withdraw effects, either real or
personal, from the just claims of creditors of the insolvent debtors,
and remove the same to another state, where, under the laws of
that state, such creditors might get no part of their claims on
account of the preferences given by the deed of assignment. There
is no comity existing between states as would require the courts of
this state to sanction any policy that might result in such an
inequitable distribution of the estates of insolvent debtors-certainly
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not to the prejudice of creditors resident in this state. It is therefore quite plain, if the attaching creditor in this case was a citizen
of this state, or a corporation existing under the laws of this state,
it would be entitled to the property attached, as against the foreign
assignee, who seeks to remove it to another state to be administered
under the laws of such state. That our laws will not permit. As
has been seen, the attaching creditor in this case is a corporation,
existing under the laws of the state of Massachusetts, and the
question arises, is there any reason for applying a different rule to
it than would be applied to a creditor residing in this state ? There
is much reason for the doctrine that, when " once properly in
court, and acknowledged as a suitor, neither the law, nor the courts
administering the law, will admit any distinction between the
citizen of one state and that of another." This court has distinctly
recognised this principle in Bhawn v. Pearce, 110 Ill. 850. No
reason is believed to exist for making any distinction between resident and non-resident creditors seeking the aid of our courts.
They should, as a general rule, be admitted to the same rights
under the law. Had this attaching creditor been a corporation,
existing under the laws of New York, and located in that state,
where their insolvent debtors reside, a -very different question might
be presented. In such cases the courts of this state might not be
willing to lend their aid to such a creditor, to enable him to obtain
an inequitable advantage over other creditors residing in the same
state where the common fund is to be administered. That would
be to assist one creditor to the injury of another. But no reason
exists for denying a citizen of another state, owing no duty to
observe the laws of the state under which the assignment was made,
to become a suitor in the courts of this state, on terms of equality
with our own citizens, and giving.to him the same rights under the
law as would be awarded to resident citizens. This would conform
to the guaranty contained in the federal constitution that "the
citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states," and accords better with
a sense of justice and right.
The judgment of the appellate court will be affirmed.
INvoLuNTARY ASSIGNMENT.-Contrary to the English doctrine, the rule
prevails generally in the United States,
that an invaluntary asgignment of property in a foreign jurisdiction will not

be recognised here for the purpose of
defeating an attachment subsequently
made. As regards this class of assignments, the states are treated as foreign
to each other. Ins. Co. v. Bank, 68 Ill.
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384 ; Piercev. O'Brien, 129 Mass. 314 ;
May v. Wannemacher, 111 Id. 202;
Taylor v. Columbian Ins. Co., 14 Allen
353; Abraham v. Plestoro, 3 Wend.
538; s. c. I Paige 236 ; WVillitts v.
Waite, 25 N. Y. 577 ; Caskie v. Webster,
2 Wall., Jr. 131.
This rule has been extended to attachments by citizens of the state where the
assignment was made: Rhawn v. Pearce,
110 Ill. 350; Hibernia Nat. Bank v.
La Comb, 84 N. Y. 367. But see,
.Einer v. Beste, 32 Mo. 240.
VOLUNTARY AssIGNMENTS.-1. Attachments by residents of the state where
the assignment was made. As against a
subsequent attachment by a resident of
the state where the assignment was
made, the latter will generally be upheld:
Liner v. Beste, 32 Mo. 240; May v.
Wannemacher, II1 Mass. 202 ; Richardson v. Forepaugh, 7 Gray 546; Whipple
v. Thayer, 16 Pick. 25 ; Danielsv. Willard, Id. 36; Burlocc v. Taylor, Id.
335; Hall v. Boardman, 14 N. H. 38 ;
Kidder v. Tufts, 48 Id. 121 ; Hoag v.
Hint, 21 Id. 106; Bholen v. Cleveland,
5 Mason 174; Noble v. Smith, 6 R. I.
446 ; Hanford v. Paine, 32 Vt. 442;
.A1owry v. Crocker, 6 Wis. 326. See
also, Weider v. Maddox, 1 S. W. Rep.
168; s. c. 66 Tex.
The fact that the assignment contains
preferences, valid where made, but forbidden by the laws of the state where
the attachment is levied, will probably
not change the rule, unless the effect of
the statutory inhibition is to render void
the assignment itself and not merely the
preferences: M1loore v. Bonnell, 31 N.J.
L. 90 ; Richardsonv. Leavitt, 1 La. Am.
430; Thurston v. Rosenfidd, 42 Mo.
474.
But if the effect of the statutory provision against preferences is to avoid the
assignment containing' them, such an
assignment will not be upheld against an
attachment by a resident of the state
where the assignment was made:
Stricker v. Tinkham, 35 Ga. 176;

Mason v. Stricker, 37 Id. 262 ; Moore
v. Church, 30 N. W. Rep. 855; s. o.
70 Ia.
;Loving v. Pairo, 10 Id. 283,
contra; Butler v. Wendell, 57 Mich. 72.
In a proper case an injunction may be
granted to restrain a citizen from pursuing an attachment in another state after
an assignment has been made: De Hon
v. Foster, 4 Alien 545. But where the
insolvency laws of the two states are
conflicting, and a lien by attachment has
been acquired, equity will not interfere :
Warner v. .affray, 96 N. Y. 248 ; Jenks
v. Ludden, 34 Minn. 482.
In Paine v. Lester, 44 Conn. 196, in
sustaining an attachment against an assignment by a citizen of the state where
the assignment was made, contrary to
the general rule above stated the court
said :." The citizens of all our sister
states have, by the Constitution of the
United States, the same privileges with
our citizens, and any one of them who
has availed himself of the legal remedies
furnished by our laws, to secure payment
of a debt due him, has the same claim to
the assistance of our courts that one of
our own citizens would have."
2. Attachments by home creditors.
Where the laws of a state forbid preferences in general assignments for the benefit of creditors, a foreign assignment
with preferences, though valid where
made, will not be sustained against a
subsequent attachment by a resident
creditor: Zipcey v. Thompson, I Gray
243; King v. Johnson, 5 Her. (Del.)
31; Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y.
657; Fuller v. Steiglitz, 27 Ohio St.
355, 364; Van Winkle v. Arrtrong,
5 Atl. Rep. 449 ; s. 0. 49 N. J. L.
In Bryan v. Brisbin, 26 Mo. 423, the
court said: "Under such an assignment
[with preferences] here the title would
pass but the provision for preferences
would be totally disregarded. As the
management of the thnds under the
assignment in Minnesota is entirely
beyond the reach of our courts, it is plain
that is must be regarded as practically
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in conflict with oui laws. * * * It is
very obvious that if we hold the assignment to prevail over the attachment we
make a discrimination against our own
citizens."
But the authority of the above rule
has been denied : Atherton Co. v. Ives,
20 Fed. Rep. (Ky.) 894; Law v. Mills,
18 Penn. St. 185. See Philson v. Barnes,
50 Id. 230.
Where foreign assignments have contained other provisions in conflict with
the law of the place where the attachment was made, at the instance of a resident creditor, the latter has been sustained : Schuler v. Israel, 27 Fed. Rep.
(Mo.) 851 ; Pierce v. O'Brien, 129
Mass. 314; Faulkner v. Hyman, 142 Id.
53 ; Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139.
In many cases attachments by resident
creditors have been upheld against foreign
assignments, though such assignments
would have been good had they been
made in the states where the attachments
were levied. In Heyer v. Alexander,
108 Il. 385, it was said: "The doctrine
is that such a conveyance is subject to
the claim of resident creditors where the
property is located. This we regard as
the true rule. It is not just or fair that
creditors in this state should be compelled
to go to a foreign state to receive a pro
ratashare of the debtor's property, when
they perhaps extended credit alone upon
the faith of the debtor's property in this
state and to which they looked for payment." See also, Ingraham v. Geyer,
13 Mass. 146; Osborn v. Adams, 18
Pick. 245 ; Fall Rirer Iron Works v.
Croade, 15 Id. II : Fox v. Adams, 5
Greenl. 245 ; Johnson v. Parker, 4
Bush (Ky.) 149 ; Chafee v. Fourth Nat.
Bank, 71 Ale. 514; Dunlap v. Rogers,
47 N. H. 281.
On grounds of comity the contrary
doctrine has bden adopted by some courts:
Walters v. Whitlock, 9 Fla. 86: Askew
v. La (ynge Exchange Bank (Mo.). 24
Am. L. Reg. 399, and note; Caskie v.
Webster, 2 Wall. Jr. 131 ; Speedy. May,

17 Penn. St. 91 ; Means v. Hapgood, 19
Pick. 105. See also, Train v. K'endall,
137 Mass. 366.
3. Attachments by Residents of a Third
State.-After diligent search we believe
that the principal case is the first clear
decision upon the principle involved. In
Bentley v. Whittemore, 19 N. J. Eq. 462,
real estate in New Jersey was attached
by residents of New Hampshire and
Rhode Island, and claimed by the grantee
of an assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of creditors in Nw
York. The assignment contained preferences forbidden by the laws of New
Jersey. The court said : "Upon what
principle can a citizen of another state
ask us to refuse to recognize the validity
of an assignment made in the state of
New York and in conformity to her
laws ? Upon what plea, consistent with
comity, under such circumstances, are
the authorities of this government to repudiate a transaction valid by the laws
of a sister state ? If the question touchbd
one of our own citizens, we would vindicate our rejection of such transaction
on the ground of our statute, passed legitimately for the special regulation of the
affhirs of such citizen. But if such a
rejection relates to the citizens of another
state, how is such a line of conduct to be
justified ? We might, indeed, urge as a
sort of excuse, that the laws of New
York regulating assignments were not
similar to the laws of this state, and that
we preferred the regulations of. our own
law. * * * But I cannot think we have
a right to endeavor to arbitrate in such
a concern."
But though the court seems to discuss
the precise question of the principal case,
it is to be observed that in the New Jersey case the real estate involved had
been sold by the assignee before the attachment was levied, while there is a
well defined distinction as regards cases
where there has been an actual change
of possession : Howard Nat. Bank v.
King, 10 Abb. N. Cas. 346, and note to

PULLMAN PALACE CAR CO. v. GAYLORD.
Askew v. La Cynge Bank, 24 Am. L.
Reg. 410.
In Butler v. Wendell, 57 Mich. 62, a
New York assignment with preferences,
which would have been invalid if made
in Michigan, was declared superior to an
attachment of personal property by an
Illinois creditor.
In Sanderson v. Bradford, 10 N. H.
260, a Massachusetts assignment containing preferences invalid if made in New
Hampshire, was upheld against an attachment of personal property by an
English creditor.
In Chafee v. Bank, 71 Me. 514, the
question was discussed, but in that case
the attaching creditor had assented to
the assignment by accepting a dividend
under it. See also, Receiver v. Bank of
Plainfield,34 N. J. Eq. 450 ; FirstiVat.
Bank of Attleboro v. Hughes, 10 Mb.
App. 7 ; Atwook v. ProtectionIns. Co.,
14 Conn. 555, overruled by 44 Conn.
196.
Upon a careful review of the authorities and the reasons supporting them,
we incline to believe the doctrine of the
principal case correct. To the reasoning
in Bentley v. Whittemore, cited above,
that of an early Missouri case seems an
apt reply: "But admitting that our
courts would be bound, upon principles

of comity, to give effect to an assignment made in Pennsylvania as against
creditors living in that state, upon what
principle must the Pennsylvania law be
administered here to a creditor who
resides in Maryland? Why may he not
insist on the lex domicilia with the same
justice as the assignors who live in Philadelphia?
The lex loci contractus can
hardly apply in this case, inasmuch as
the creditor suing never acceded to the
terms of this assignment and was no
party to the instrument; and the law of
the domicile may as well be applicable to
the contract on which he sues as the law
of the interpleader's domicile to that contract on which they rely. The ouly reasonable and fair rule in a case of this
character seems to be to administer the
law of this state, the state in which the
property lies, where the suit is brought,
and whose laws are invoked for the protection of the rights of the respective
parties:" Brown v. Knox, 6 Mo. 302
Jenks v. Ludden, 34 Minn. 482.
For a discussion of the attempted distinction between debts and movables,
see note to Askew v. La Cynge Bank, 24
Am. L. Reg. 408.
CHAs. A. RoBBiNs.
Lincoln, Nab.

Superior Oourt of Kentucky.
PULLMAN PALACE CAR COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. THOMAS G.
GAYLORD, APPELLEE.
The Pullman Palace Car Company does not undertake to provide its cars with
safes or other receptacles in which to deposit baggage, wearing apparel, money,
jewelry, or other valuables (23 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 788), and hence is not liable
for the loss of valuable jewelry stolen from a passenger, there being no other omission on the part of the company shown except the failure to provide such safe
or other receptacle and a force to guard the car. The company is only bound to
keep a reasonable watch over the plaintiff and his property.

APPEAL from Jefferson Common Pleas Court.
BOWDEN, J.-On a former appeal, prosecuted by the appellant,
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it was held that a demurrer to a petition that failed to charge it
with negligence, whereby the scarf-pin was lost, should have been
sustained. It was then said that the company undertakes to keep
a reasonable watch over the passenger and his propez ty, and that
the faithful performance of this undertaking is the limit of its duty
in this respect.
The amending allegation made on the return of the case'is that
the scarf-pin " was, by the negliqence of defendant, its agents and.
employees in charge of said car, stolen from and lost to plaintiff," and that the "defendant, in the conduct of its business aforesaid, induced him to rely upon the watchfulness and care of defendant, its agents and employees in charge of said sleeping-car, to
prevent such loss, which was occasioned without fault of plaintiff,
and wholly through the neglect of defendant to exercise such ordinary care to prevent the same."
The jury found specially :
1. The company's servants in charge of the car were not negligent in the discharge of their duties.
2. They kept a reasonable watch over the plaintiff and his property.
3. They were competent and faithful.
4. The loss of the pin was not caused oy nor the result of their
failure to keep a reasonable watch over the plaintiff and his property.
5. The question was: "Was the scarf-pin of plaintiff lost by
reason of the negligence of the defendant's officers, servants or employees in charge of the car on which plaintiff was a passenger, or
of any other of defendant's officers, servants or employees ?" The
answer was, "We say yes."
6. Question: "If they answer question 5in the affirmative, then
they will, in answer to this, say what officers, servants or employees
of defendant were guilty of such negligence, and in what respect
were they or either of them so negligent?" Answer: " We say
the president and directors of the company were negligent in not
providing a proper receptacle for passengers' property, or in not
providing force to guard the car."
7. The pin was worth $300.
The fifth finding is not that the servants in charge of the car
were negligent; they had been fully exculpated by the preceding
findings; the jury meant that others had been negligent, as specifically stated in the sixth answer. The form of this finding is not
VOL. XXXV.-65
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precise ; but special verdicts must not be subjected to the utmost
rigor of criticism ; it is enough if it appears with reasonable certainty what the jury means. The meaning here is that the president and directors had been negligent in both of these things : 1st.
They had not provided a proper receptacle for the property of passengers. 2d. They had not supplied the car with a sufficient number of servants to guard it ; and their conclusion was that the
absence of either of these things constituted negligence.
It is clear that the company was entitled to a judgment on the
findings, unless the fifth and sixth answers are sufficient to prevent it.
1. There was not a proper receptacle for passengers' property.
Construing the verdict in the light of the pleadings we will suppose this to mean that the company, in having its car constructed,
had not provided a secure place in which it could put the property
of passengers, thus protecting it from other passengers or from
those casually in the car.
It seems to us something more than doubtful if the pleadings
invited an examination of this question as one of fact. It is difficult to believe that even the most cautious counsel, on reading the
allegations of the petition, would think it even prudent to advise
the company to prove that its cars, being a parlor by day and a
lodging-room by night, could not be so constructed as to perform
these functions, and yet provide greater security. Such are the
operating forces that possibly a plan which, in the opinion of the
inexperienced would meet every want, would be regarded by those
familiar with the conditions as a constant menace to property and
life. It is a question so very different from that of casual negligence in management, that the ordinary form in which negligence
may be charged does not seem to give sufficient notice that such
an issue will be made.
But conceding the sufficiency of the allegation, upon what ground
can one complain of the inadequate construction of the car?
There it is. He sees it. All -the possibilities resulting from its
construction lie before him. He knows there is no way by which
he can lock others out; and he would be a reckless man who would
avail himself of an'advantage so full of peril. He knows there is
no place of absolute security for his attire, his money or his jewelry;
and he knows that the company does not offer to become the custodian of them. If, in his opinion, there is too much risk, though
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there be a faithful watch, he should not attempt it. The consequences to sleeping-car companies would be ruinous if a pilfered
passenger could, having taken a berth with a full knowledge of the
conditions, have it submitted to a jury whether a different construction of the car would not have been more secure, or whether a
safe depository might not have been kept on the car, with a salaried
attendant to deposit and deliver to passengers as they come and go.
The answer to all such questions is, that the company does not
undertake that kind of business.
It has no contract relation with a person in regard to his property
except as to such reasonable sums of money as may be proper for
current expenses, personal attire, watches, and such belongings as
go with the person, and such as a guest at an inn might properly
take with him to his room at the inn-keeper's risk. It is not a
common carrier, nor an inn-keeper, nor under a like liability. If
it should have been a depository and should accept the custody of
the passenger's effects, it would assume the liability of a bailee for
hire; but under the rule proposed it becomes liable absolutely and
unconditionally for everything the passengers have with them,
unless it assumes responsibility by taking the custody; the mere
absence of the depository would be negligence; and there would
be no escape. The company, which is not a common carrier, and
which does not desire to become one, would thus be forced to become
the actual custodian of personal effects, increasing its expenses by
the necessity of employing men of achieved moral reputation at
prices that would probably increase the charge for berths, and then,
even with the greatest care, incurring the responsibility without the
reward of carrier of goods; or it would fare worse by being held
liable on the ground that a failure to undertake this custody is
itself proof of negligence making it liable. For when it -is conceded that the company will not take the custody when tendered, a
passenger need not make the futile tender. He may retain the
custody of his effects at the unconditional risk of the company.
If that were the law, it would have been invoked in some of the
adjudged cases. Most of them show that the passenger placed his
effects under his pillow or elsewhere near his person in the berth ;
but in none is there any intimation that the company could be .held
liable on the ground that it did not provide a secure place. No
such provision has ever existed; and the steady negative evidence
of the decided cases is against such a ground of liability.
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2. The company did not provide a force sufficient to guard the
car. It is not bound to such excessive and expensive care. It must
keep a reasonable watch. It is a fact well known that one conductor and one porter constitute the usual force. The findings here
show that there were " servants in charge of the car," how many
does not appear. They were competent, faithful and diligent. Such
is the finding. If, as the jury say, they kept a reasonable watch
over the plaintiff and his property, and the property was not lost
by reason of their negligence, the whole duty of the company was
performed, and no value whatever is to be given to the conclusion
of the jury that it was negligent not to provide a force sufficiently
numerous to guard the car. That is a legal opinion, and we do not
think it is sustained by adjudged cases. It certainly goes far
beyond the measure of duty prescribed by this court in its former
opinion, which constitutes the law of this case, and could not be
disregarded by us if we were not, as we are, entirely satisfied that
it is correct. One competent and faithful watcher at a time has
been considered sufficient; it is the custom to have only one. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Gardner,16 Amer. & Eng. Rd. Oases
324, is a case in which the company was held not to be liable for
implied negligence on account of having only one. No force to
do guard duty is required.
Judgment should have been rendered for the defendant on the
findings, and the judgment is now reversed and the case is remanded, with direction to set it aside and render a judgment for
the defendant for costs.
We have examined this record and concur.-J. Q. WARD, J.
BARBOUR.
This easein a former appeal was reported in 23 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.)
788.
The general question involved was
also considered in Lewis v. N. Y. Cent.
Sleeping Car Co., ante, p. 359, and Whitney v. PMllman Palace Car Co., ante, p.
366, in the notes to which we collected
the cases upon the subjiect. Upon the
present appeal the questions are somewhat different. The case is somewhat
interesting as an example of the proneness of juries to travel outside the record
for the purpose of meeting what they
consider the equities of the case, even if

by doing so they involve their verdict in
inconsistency. The court has, however,
met the issue raised by the special findings, and has, as it seems to us, arrived
at a reasonable and just conclusion. To
hold otherwise than was held in the principal case would impose an unreasonable
liability upon a very useful, if not indispensible, class of public servants. We
think the rule that the company has performed its duty if it exercises reasonable
and ordinary care for the security of the
property of its passengers, having in
view the danger reasonably to be apprehended under the circumstances of the
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case, which appears to have been the rule
of decision in the principal case, is all
that reason and justice require for the
protection of the public, it being well
settled that such companies are neither

innkeepers nor common carriers. See
note to Lewis v. N. Y. Cent. Steeping
Car Co., ante.
M1. D. EWELL.
Chicago.

Supreme Judicial Court of fassachusetts.
ELIJAH C. LAWRENCE, APPELLANT, V. PULLMAN PALACE CAR
COMPANY, APPE-LLEE.
The Pullman Palace Car Company is not liable in damages for refusing to sell
sleeping-car accommodationq to a person not having a proper railroad ticket entitling
him to the use of such accommodations.

APPEAL

from Superior Court of Suffolk County.

DEviNs, J.-The gist of the plaintiff's claim is that he was
wrongfully refused accommodations in the sleeping car of the
defendant in coming from Baltimore to New York, by the defendant's servants, and that on declining to leave the car he was ejected
therefrom.
His argument assumes that it was, for the defendant to determine
under what circumstances a passenger be allowed to purchase a
berth, and incidentally the other accommodations afforded by the
sleeping car. An examination of the contract with the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, by virtue of which the cars owned by
the defendant were conveyed over its railroad, shows that while
their cars were to be furnished by the defendant corporation, they
were so furnished "to be used by the railroad company for the
transportation of passengers," and that its employees were to be
governed by the rules and regulations of the railroad company,
such as it might adopt from time to time for the government of its
own employees. While, therefore, the defendant company was to
collect the fares for the accommodations furnished by their cars,
keep them in proper order and attend upon the passengers, it was
for the railroad company to determine who should be entitled to
enjoy the accommodations of their cars and by what regulations
this use of the cars should be governed. The defendant company
could not certainly'furnish a berth in its cars until the party
requesting it had become entitled to transportation by the railroad
company as a passenger, and he would also be entitled to the trans-
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portation for such rates, distances or under such circumstances, as
the railroad company should determine to be those under which the
defendant company -would be authorized to furnish him with its
accommodations. The defendant company could only contract with
a passenger when he was of such a class that the railroad company
permitted the contract to be made.
The railroad company had classified its trains, fixing the terms
upon which persons should become entitled to transportation in the
sleeping cars and the cars in which such transportation would be
afforded. It was their regulation that between Baltimore and New
York this accommodation should only be furnished to those holding
a ticket over the whole route. It does not appear that this was an
unreasonable rule, but, whether it was so or not, it was the regulation of the railroad company, and not the defendant. The evidence
was "that the ordinary train conductors of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company have full and entire authority over the porters and
conductors of the Pullman cars in regard to the matter of determining who shall ride in the cars and under what circumstances,
and in regard to any other thing, except the details of the cars,
and attending to the comfort of passengers therein." The defendant's servant, the plaintiff, having entered the sleeping car, informed
him that his "split" tickets, as they were termed, were not such as
would entitle him to purchase a berth, and that he could sell only
to those holding "through tickets intact to the point to which
sleeping accommodations were desired." The plaintiff, was in no
way disturbed, until the train conductor (who was not defendant's
servant) came into the car and informed the plaintiff that his tickets
were not such as to entitle him to purchase the sleeping-car tickets,
and several times urged the plaintiff to leave the sleeping-car, which
the plaintiff refused to do. Whether accommodation was rightly
refused to plaintiff or not in the sleeping-car, the refusal was the
act of the railroad company's servant, and not of defendant's, whose
duty it was to be guided by the train conductor.
The ejection of plaintiff was also the act of the railroad company
and not of the defendant. It is the contention of plaintiff that
even if he might be ejected from the car it was done in an improper
manner. The plaintiff testified that he was waiting for a "show
of force," after his repeated refusals to leave the car. This exhibition of force was made by the train conductor, who put his hand
upon him, when the plaintiff rose and yielded thereto. The Pull-
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man conductor took hold of plaintiff's arm when he rose and aided
the plaintiff in passing along the aisle and in crossing the platform
of the cars, but the evidence does not show that he used or exercised any force whatever. Even if he had used force upon the
plaintiff, he was not doing the business of the defendant company
-he was assisting the train conductor in the duty he was performing as servant of the railroad. To conduct him across from one
car to another, in the manner described by plaintiff himself, after
he had repeatedly refused to leave the car, affords no evidence of
any removal in an improper manner. The act of defendant's
servant was in every way calculated to assist plaintiff in his transit
from one car to another.
Nor is the fact that the car into which the plaintiff was passed
subsequently became cold, important, even if it were possible to
hold the defendant responsible for the act of its servant. So far
as appears by the evidence, there is no reason to believe that when
plaintiff entered the car it was not in fit condition to receive passengers, and the management of it was entirely with the railroad
company, and not the defendant.
Judgment on the verdict for defendant.
The above case is an important addition to the literature upon the important
subject therein discussed. The reasoning of the court is so clear and conclu-

sive that citation of authority is unnecessary.
M. D. EwELL.
Chicago.
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As an abstract proposition, a belief in spiritualism does not prove insanity. But
a person may be a monomaniac on that subject, or on any form of religion.
The rule that a person who occupying a confidential relation receives a benefit, has
the burden of proving the absence of undue influence, applies with peculiar force
where the beneficiary is the priest, confessor, clergyman or spiritual adviser of the
benefactor, and with no less force where the parties are a believer in spiritualism and
a professed medium.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
TEMPLE, J.-The contract on which this action is founded is set
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out in full on the former appeal (65 Cal. 184). It is there said to
be valid as an ante-nuptial contract. The defendant set up as a
defence that at the time the alleged contract was made his intestate
was insane and incapable of entering into a contract, and that it
was procured by the use of undue influence by the plaintiff.
The court found that all the allegations of the complaint were
true, except as to the capacity of Jarvis to contract; and that all
the affirmative matters set up in the answer were true, except that
plaintiff and P. B. Nagle did not, nor did either of them, coerce
Jarvis otherwise than by taking advantage of his weak and unsound
mind. The findings, therefore, plainly cover all the issues in the
case, and the only question for our consideration is, whether there
is any evidence which could justify the conclusion 7 Upon this
proposition there can be no doubt.
1. There was evidence tending to prove insanity generally, and
not merely that he was insane on the subject of spiritualism. J.
Miller, an intimate acquaintance, thought he was insane. To the
same effect is the testimony of Mrs. A. Walker, J. W. Houston,
S. B. Lusk and Lee Stanly ; and it is shown that plaintiff herself
stated that she believed him insane. And then there is much
testimony as to facts which would tend to show an unsound mind.
2. There is much testimony tending to prove that Jarvis was
insane on the subject of spiritualism. That there is such evidence
is not controverted, but counsel indulge in a long argument, and
cite many authorities to the point that a belief in spiritualism does
not prove insanity. As an abstract proposition no doubt this is so.
The law pronounces no one insane for mere religious belief, no
matter how unreasonable it may appear to the judge. But this
does not meet the ease made. A belief in the doctrines maintained
by the Methodists, Presbyterians or the' Catholics would not
establish insanity. Still, one might be a monomaniac as to either
form of religion, and so as to spiritualism. And that is precisely
the effect of the great mass of testimony in this case.
3. There is much evidence tending to show undue influence. It is
established that the relation between the parties was confidential,
in consequence of her claim to power as a medium, through which
she had great contr6l over him. This being established, the burden
was cast upon her of showing that there was no undue influence.
The rule applies with peculiar force to the relation of one and his
priest, confessor, clergyman or spiritual adviser, and certainly with
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no less force to the relation between one who is a firm believer in,
not to say a monomaniac upon the subject of, spiritualism, and the
medium in whom he has confidence and upon whom he habitually
relies. The cases upon the subject are numerous, but the law, so
far as necessary here, is crystallized in the Civil Code. Section
2219 provides that every one who voluntarily assumes a relation of
personal confidence with another is a trustee, and sect. 2235 raises
the presumption that all transactions between such persons, by
which the person trusted obtains an advantage, are entered into
under undue influence. It becomes important, then, to inquire
whether the relation did exist.
Jarvis was seventy-two years old, feeble, both mentally and
physically. He was a widower, his wife having died in August
1881, a few months before the contract questioned here was entered
into. He had lived for a great many years at Folsom a quiet life,
with no family except his wife. They had had one child, a
daughter, who married the defendant, and died twenty years ago,
leaving two children. Jarvis had been a music-teacher, and had
accumulated some property. He was for many years a firm
believer in spiritualism. The belief had grown upon him until, in
the opinion of the witnesses, it had become a monomania. His
mind would drift to the subject upon all occasions. He relied
upon supposed spiritual advice in his business transactions. When
warned against trusting certain persons, he said: "It will be all
right in the next world ; they are spiritualists." He sold a farm
for $2000, to be paid for in instalments of $200 a year, without
interest. He had been offered $250 a year rent. He said the
spirits told him he must sell; that he was governed entirely by the
spirits. The purchaser was a spiritualist. He invested several
thousand dollars in mines, under the supposed advice of spirits.
Most of this money was lost. He offered a lady $1500 to attend
seances and become a medium. To another lady he offered to convey a piece of land if she would become a medium. He believed
he could reform all the convicts if he could get them to read a
spiritualistic paper. He said he had got the right idea of spiritualism, and was going to publish a work which would astonish the
world. He admitted that he was controlled by mediums.
One witness said he was a mental wreck from the time he lost his
daughter, and there is much evidence that he became still worse
after the death of his wife. His conduct was very strange during
VOL. XXXV.-66
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her last illness. He did not believe in giving her medicine or
nourishment. The medium said she would die and the spirits
would keep her until then. He did not wish a doctor, as the spirits
would do nothing if he had one. He objected to cooking being
done in the house, the smell would keep the spirits out. The doors
and windows must be left open so they could come in. He was
angry when they gave her stimulants, because if she were to die
intoxicated she would remain so in the spirit land. He knew of
one man who was killed while drunk, and who wds still drunk
fifteen years after his death.
In this condition of health, mental and physical, Jarvis met the
plaintiff. She is said by her counsel to be an artist, who has a
studio in San Francisco; a highly educated, refined and accomplished lady. When Jarvis first made her acquaintance does not
definitely appear, but it was evidently shortly after the death of his
wife, when he went to consult her as a medium to find out how
much money he should give his granddaughter to use. In February, after Mrs. Jarvis's death, plaintiff was giving seances at
Folsom. Jarvis had induced her to go there to be developed as a
medium, and gave her fifty dollars per month to come. She
remained on these terms for some three months, giving seances,
which were attended by Jarvis, and to which he invited his friends.
The evidence shows that he had the most exalted opinion of her
powers as a medium, and that he was much under her control. He
said himself that she had great influence over him when she was
around. There is evidence that plaintiff herself said that she
believed that Jarvis was crazy, and a medium could do anything in
the world with him.
We think this is sufficient to show that there was evidence upon
which the court could find the existence of a relation of a peculiar
trust and confidence between them, similar to that between a
religious devotee and his spiritual adviser, and the proof of which
would throw upon the plaintiff the burden of showing fair dealing.
But the record contains evidence of undue influence and adverse
pressure. Mrs. Wallace testified: "Speaking of the time when the
contract that is in suit here was executed, she said that they had
had trouble and had words. She said that she wished him to settle
something on her, and he asked her if she was afraid that he would
not leave her anything, or would not leave her as well off as her
other husband had left.her, and she said that she locked the door
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and kept him in the room for about two hours, and that she put the
key in her pocket. * * * They talked about the matter in my
presence, and they both told me that which I have stated. She
said that they finally came to a settlement, and he agreed to settle
something on her, and she opened the door and got a boy and sent
him down to Nagle's office, and he came up and drew a draft of the
contract that day, and the next day she told me that Jarvis came
inand she asked him if he would have a chair, and she said he
acted queerly. Then she said that she told him he would not have
time to sit down if he was going down to keep his word and sign
that contract. He asked her what contract, and he said I have
made no contract. * * * She said that at that time he acted as if
he was either drugged or crazy, and that he did not act as if he
knew what he was about, and did not seem to know that he had
ever drawn up a contract. * * She expressed herself as believing
that he was an old fool and did not know what he was about. She
said at that time she believed that he was crazy."
There was evidence on the part of the plaintiff contradicting some
of this evidence, but this only creates a conflict. If we could consider the testimony, however, as a trial court, we could not say that
the evidence does not sustain the finding.
Judgment and order affirmed.
The decision of the court turns on the
point that there was sufficient evidence
to sustain the findings of the court. But
it involves also in some measure the
question of the capacity of a party to
execute a contract with another where
one or both are believers in spiritualism.
A very interesting case, in which the
question of how far a belief in spiritualism affects the power of a party to
execute a contract or will, is Cafin Will
Case, 32 Wis. 557, 560. In that case,
LYON, J., in delivering the opinion of
the court, thus states the facts: "We
pass at once to consider whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the finding
of the jury that Chafin was of unsound
mind when he executed the instrument
purporting to be his last will and testainert. Taking the testimony most
strongly in favor of the contestants, the
claim that the deceased was of an unsound

mind when he executed that instrument
is based upon certain peculiarities in his
opinions, character and conduct, which
may be briefly stated, as follows:
" 1. He had faith in the statements of
professed clairvoyants, fortune tellers
and spiritual mediums, and through the
influence of one, or all of these, he was
induced to make journeys to New York,
Pennsylvania, Michigan and Iowa, in
search of mines and hidden treasures,
which, of course, be never found. He
also intimated his belief in witchcraft to
one of the witnesses.
"2. He sometimes professed to live
without committing sin. He was a man
of high temper and strong prejudices,
was very positive and firm in asserting
and maintaining his opinions, and exceedingly intolerant toward those who did
not agree with him in sentiment, especially on political and religious subjects.
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He once attempted to shoot a man who,
he claimed, persisted in carrying off his
wood, and when prosecuted for it and
bailed, said that had he been sent to
prison he would have concealed himself
in a grove and shot the justice.
" 3. He had many peculiar notions on
mechanical and scientific subjects. He
once thought that he could invent a
machine or instrument, which would
indicate the location of mineral deposits,
and tried to do so. He attempted persistently to invent or discover perpetual
motion, or rather some instrument or
apparatus having that quality. He
believed that he could invent torpedoes,
and perhaps other engines of war, with
which the rebel fleets and atmies might
be speedily destroyed, and he addressed
President Lincoln on the subject. Ie
denied that the earth revolved on its
axis, but insisted that the sun revolved
around the earth, and presented argaments to sustain his theory. He also
denied the correctness of the computations
of astronomers to determine the distance
from the earth to the sun. He thought
that rain could be produced by concussion
of the atmosphere caused by the firing
of cannon, and he urged arguments in
support of this theory also. He owned
two small cannon, and offered to bring
on rain in a dry time by firing them, if
his neighbors would buy the powder, but
they refused to do so, and the theory does
not seem to have been subjected to an
actual test. He had a taste for possessing firearms. Besides his artillery, he
owned a rifle and a shot-gun, and on
extraordinary occasions, as on his birthday anniversary, or that of his wife, on
election days, Fourth of July, and the
like, he would frequently fire his artillery
by way of celebrating the occasion.
"4. He believed that his former wife,
from whom he had been divorced, was
unfaithful to him, and insisted that he
was not the father of her youngest child,
who was born while he lived with the
mother. He disliked all his children,

and frequently denounced them as transgressors, and entirely unworthy of his
bounty. About two years before his
death he stated to a witness that he once
staid at the house of one of his sons inlaw, and heard the family up nearly all
night, and that he feared they thought he
had money and that they might kill him.
On the other hand it appears that wherever he had the opportunity to bring any
of his peculiar notions to a practical test,
if the test failed to establish the correctness of his views, he quite readily abandoned them. Thus, after his return from
his various journeys in search of mines
and hidden treasures, he admitted his
failure, and for the last five or six years
of his life we hear nothing from him on
these subjects. Then again, when he
failed to discover minerals by the use of
the machine or apparatus which he
invented for that purpose, which was fifteen years or more before his death, it
does not appear that he ever alluded
to the subject afterwards. It was also
abundantly proved that his judgment
upon business matters was sound ; that
he was industrious and frugal, a good
farmer and a close, careful trader. He
had a great desire to amass a fortune,
and did acquire considerable property
before his death. He was not a very
liberal or generous man, yet he was
strictly honest in all his dealings. From
these data we are called upon to determine the mental condition of the deceased
at the time he executed the instrument
purporting to be his last will and testament. It may be observed at the outset,
that his various traits of character were
so strongly marked, it does not seem difficult to determine from the evidence
' what manner of man he was.' A person of merely negative qualities may
pass through life, and little comparatively
be known of him by the community in
which he has lived, and it may be very
difficult to delineate accurately the character of such person. Not so, however,
with his opposite. The man of positive
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character and strong convictions, who
freely utters his sentiments on all subjects, and gives unrestrained expression
to every emotion, ' may be known and
read of all men.' Bradley Chafin (as
he was familiarly called) belonged to the
latter class. He was a man of most
positive character, and was entirely
unreserved in the expression of his
opinions and feelings. His mind was
active but undisciplined, and be was
visionary and illogical. He was an
independent, and to some extent an
original thinker. He possessed great
self appreciation, but seemed to be quite
indifferent to the opiniun of others concerning himself; as the professors of
phrenology might express it, he had large
self-esteem and small love of approbation.
He loved wealth, and having some inventive mechanical genius, thought that he
could amass a fortune by means of some
wonderful invention. Hence his apparatus to discover the location of bodies
of mineral in the earth, and his attempts
to solve the problem of perpetual motion.
He was credulous, and perhaps superstitious : hence his ready belief of the clairvoyants and mediums who ministered to
his love of wealth by pointing out to him
an easy method of obtaining it. Hence
also his belief in dreams which seemed
to indicate to him the location of mines
and hidden treasures. He was suspicious and jealous, which may account for
his fears on one occasion that his relatives
might take his life, and also his attacks
upon the character for chastity of his
former wife, and his denial of the legitimacy of one of her children. Evidently
he never formed any very strong domestic
attachments, and his conjugal and paternal feelings were not sufficiently powerful
to save his wife and children from the
consequences of his jealousy, his credulity, and his violent, implacable temper. Such was Bradley Chafin. It
would be more agreeable could his mental portrait be truthfully painted in softer
colors. But all that can be done in that

direction is to give due prominence to
that redeeming trait to his character, his
strict integrity in business affairs."
The jury and lower court found him
to be insane.- But the Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the circuit
court, on the ground that the verdict was
clearly contrary to the weight of evidence.
Said the court, commencing on page
563 : "But does all this demonstrate
that the deceased was insane ? Ignorance, superstition, jealousy, avarice,
self-conceit, violence of temper, unjust
hatred of wife and children, may each
and all, under certain circumstances, be
consistent with the condition of sanity.
These may all be accounted for on the
hypothesis of temperament and defective
education, excluding entirely the hypothesis of insanity. Because Bradley
Chafin had many peculiarities ofcharacter,
because he entertained opinions which
were generally deemed absurd and
extravagant, and because his conduct in
some respects was eccentric and foolish,
we must not, without further reflection,
conclude that he was insane. We must
carefully examine these alleged evidences
or indicia of insanity, and ascertain, if
we can, whether they do in fact prove
that he was insane when he executed the
instrument which purports to be his last
will and testament. As already intimated, there is not one of these alleged
indications that the deceased was insane,
which, when considered independently
of the others, is not entirely consistent
with the hypothesis of sanity. Certainly
there are numerous people whose sanity
is undoubted, who believe in the supernatural, and who trust as implicity in
the prognostications of fortune-tellers,
clairvoyants, and spiritual mediums as
the deceased ever did; and who also have
faith in dreams, and believe in the existence of witches, and in the possibility
of perpetual motion as applied to machinery, and of inventing instruments by
whichmineral deposits maybe discovered.
Dr. Carver, a very intelligent medical
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witness, who had been in the western
mines, testified as follows : ' I have seen
hundreds of men in the mountains, who
came there on dreams, including lawyers,
doctors and priests. Belief in clairvoyance is a common thing. Business men
here in Monroe have been and searched
for minerals under the direction of clairvoyants. Dreams are laid down in
books under the head of eccentricities.'
There are also large numbers of men
of pervertel domestic feelings, who hate
their wives and children without just
cause, or who are violent and badtempered, or who cherish the most exalted self-conceit, or who profess to live
without sin, or who reject as false the
plainest demonstrations of science and
adopt as true, the most absurd theories,
and yet, who are not insane. Such
opinions and mental qualities are not,
therefore, of themselves, evidence that
their unfortunate possessor is insane,
although they may be very absurd, and
may lead a man to do many absurd
and objectionable acts. The opinions
and feelings of the deceased which at
first view might seem to indicate insane
delusions, are those relating to his
family. But an examination of the circumstances will show, we think, that
even these fail entirely to establish the
existence of any such delusion. So far
as the imputations on the chastity of his
former wife, and the denial of the legitimacy of the daughter are concerned,
there is really no evidence showing
whether the imputation was true or false.
The presumption is that it was an unfounded imputation. But we are entirely
ignorant of the ground of Chafin's
opinion. It may have been based upon
facts and circumstances which would
have controlled a better-balanced mind
than his. It will not do to find the
existence of insane delusion in the mind
of Chafin without some proof of the fact.
As to his alienation from his children,
the evidence is that his son entered upon
a criminal course of life, and was sent to

the state prison of Illinois for some
offence ; that Chafin had serious trouble
with all three of his daughters, about
business matters, after he was divorced
from his first wife; and that the feeling
between him and his daughters was
mutually unkind and even bitter. Of
course, whether Chafin was or was not
to blame for becoming alienated from his
children, we find in the fact of such
alienation a reason, entirely foreign from
the influence of insane delusion, why he
disinherited them. His idea in relation
to torpedoes and other implements of
war were entertained at a time when
much attention was given to those subjects, and many experiments were being
made, and it is no evidence of delusion
that his active, visionary and inventive
mind was turned in the same direction.
Hence we find ourselves unable to point
out any single opinion of the deceased,
however erroneous, orany action of his,
however absurd and unusual, which we
can say was the result of insanity or
delusion produced by insanity.
"Having examined the alleged indicia
of insanity separately, let us now briefly
consider them collectively, and apply to
them a few tests recognised by science, and
approved by the judgment and experience
of mankind in general, in order to ascertain whether they are really indications
or proof of insane delusions.
"1. As a general rule, the insane or
partially insane, do not reason upon the
subjects of their hallucinations or delusions. But the peculiar opinions and
conduct of Bradley Chafin were the results of processes of reasoning. He
argued against the theory of the revolution of the earth by asserting that if a
body be projected upwards perpendicularly from the earth, itwould fall in the
place from whence it was projected,
which he claimed could not occur if the
earth revolved on its axis. His premise
was correct, but his conclusions therefrom erroneous. He believed in witches
doubtless because his Bible told him that
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they existed in ancient times, and he
could see no good reason why they should
not exist now. His theory of an apparatus to disclose the location of mines
was based upon the idea that like attracted like ; hence, in the construction of
the same, he used the kind of minjeral
which he hoped to find. His idea that
concussion of the atmosphere would cause
rain to fall had, forits foundation, the fact
which he believed to be well attested, that
heavy rainfalls accompanied or followed
immediately after great battles. When he
fancied that there was danger, on a
certain occasion, 'that the family of his
son-in-law might kill him, it was because
he claimed to have heard them up at an
unseasonable hour of the night, and he
thought they might be prompted by
avarice to take his life.
"2. Generally it is impossible to convince the insane of the absurdity of their
delusions by any arguments or actual
tests, however conclusive they maybe to
a person of sound mind. It has already
been remarked that whenever Chafin put
any of his peculiar notions to a practical
test, and found that the test failed to
demonstrate the correctness of his views,
he freely admitted the failure, and apparently abandoned the notion. Instances
of this kind are mentioned above.
"3. The really insane'are usually subject to sudden changes from one delusion
to another. True this does not always
happen. but where the patient is suffering under a settled, long continued delusion, there will seldom be any difficulty
in ascertaining whether it is really an
insane delusion or merely an erroneous
opinion based upon false reasoning or
insufficient evidence. If a man really
believes he is made of glass, or that he is
the Christ, or that he is dead and persists in the opinion, we readily conclude
that he is the victim of hallucination or
insane delusion, because such opinions
are inconsistent with the condition of
sanity. But we can draw 'no such conclusion' from the mere belief in witches,

ghosts, dreams, spiritualman festations, or
in strange and absurd views on scientific
or religious subjects, because such opinions
are consistent with sanity. We must
find stronger evidences than these of a
diseased mind, before we can pronounce
the man insane who believes in these
absurdities.
"There is no evidence to indicate any
great changes in the character or opinions
of Bradley Chafin. The testimony covers
a period of about twenty of the last years
of his life, but it fails to disclose in him
any of the ordinary and usual changes
and freaks of insanity. If his eccentricities and peculiar opinions were. really
the results of insane delusions, he was
strangely persistent in them, never yielding his opinions except upon absolute
proof that they were wrong. What he
was in 1850, that was he in 1870. Once
having conceived a dislike for his former
wife and her children, such dislike continued to the end of his life. If he
abandoned an opinion, it was because its
soundness or unsoundness admitted of
actual demonstration, and he had proved
it to be erroneous. Opinions not susceptible of such demonstration he never
If be embraced a new
abandoned.
belief, it was clearly referrable to some
preconceived theory which he believed.
In a word, he was always consistent with
himself, and his opinions and conduct
seem to have been the natural and logical
results of his character, disposition and
temperament."
Where one was a firm believer in
spiritualism, and acted in business affairs
on the communications of mediums, it
was held that he was, notwithstanding,
of sound and disposing mind: Smith's
Will, 52 Wis. 543. Mere eccentricity
of mind manifesting itself in erroneous,
foolish and absurd opinions on certain
subjects, does not constitute insane delusion, and is not of itself evidence of
insanity: Thompson v. Thompson, 21
Barb. 107. Where a testator believed
in witches, devils and spirits, which he
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fancied tormented him, lived in a strange
and brutish manner, wore an extraordinary dress, slept in a hollow gum-log,
made strange bargains and exhibited
innumerable extravagances, but was able
in other respects, to manage his affairs,
his will was pronounced valid : Lee v.
Lee, 4 McCord 183.
Where a testator had habitually spoken
of his kept mistress, who had died before
him, as having been a person of deep
religious opinions, the fact of the possible existence in his mind of a deluded
opinion upon this subject, was held to be
no evidence of his want of capacity,
since no opinion upon moral matters,
however absurd, will of itself constitute
an insane delusion: Ditchbura v. Fearn,
6 Jur. 201.
So the fact that a testator was eccentric,
exaltable, passionate and very nervous,
was on certain subjects believed by many
to be insane through excited feeling; that
he believed in spiritualism, the book of
Mormon, or in Fourierism; talked very
much like a fool; had visions, and
believed in them-is not enough to show
a want of sound and disposing mind and
memory, provided he attended constantly
to his business, and managed it with
capacity, care and skill, and in other
practical respects appeared to be of sound
mind: Turner v. Hand, 3 Wall. Jr. C.
C. 88, 103.
Where it appeared that a testator was
of strange and eccentric habits and manner; had an extraordinary way of expressing himself; seemed to believe that
one of his relatives had been murdered
by poison, and that there was a scheme
in existence to poison himself, and used
extraordinary precautions against it-it
was held that though the deceased was
eccentric he was not deranged ; that he
had not in his mind any morbid delusion
irresistibly overbearing his reason, and
that he was possessed of testamentary
capacity: Walcott v. Alleyn, Milw. 65.
A belief that the souls of men after death
pass into animals is no proof of insanity :

Bonarc's Will, 16 Abb. Pr. N. S. 128.
See also further authorities: 1Veir's Vill,
9 Dana 440; Gass v. Gass, 3 Humph.
278.
In Bonard's Will, 16 Abb. Pr. N. S.
128, the testator was a firm believer
that The souls of men after death passed
into animals.
The court said : "It
appears to me that, if a judicial officer
should assume that merely because a man
earnestly believed in that doctrine, he
was insane, or labored under an insane
delusion or monomania, incapacitating
him for making a will, if prompted by
that faith, but, though consistent with it,
wholly rational in its provisions, it would
not fall very far short, in principle, of
assuming that all mankind who do not
believe in the particular faith which the
judge accepts, respecting the future state,
are more or less insane, or the victims
of an insane delusion. This question is
entirely within the domain of opinion or
faith, and not of knowledge. A man
may properly be assumed insane upon
evidence that he is governed by hallucinations which are physically impossible
to the knowledge of all sane men, and
which are contrary to the evidence of the
senses, or who is influenced by delusions,
which are the creation of diseased reflective faculties. Hence the opinion as to
a future state, of which no man has positive knowledge, and, in regard to which
mankind have always differed, and do
widely differ to-day even in the most
civilized countries, and among the most
intellectual men, cannot, in any respect,
be deemed evidence of insanity, the only
rule by which the insanity of one of certain opinions can be determined being by
some test, founded on positive knowledge.
The insanity of an opinion must be
established only with reference to means
of knowledge accessible to men of common minds and understanding, and not
upon the results of profound scientific researches or experiment, or scholastic
theoloUgy, or religious tenets, concerning
the nature of the infinite, or the destiny
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of the race beyond the present, which
itself is too vast and mysterious a domain
for the finite mind to comprehend ; and,
if we are so much at fault, or deficient,
and so at variance, in opinion of the
truth of the present, how can we presume
to hold one insane as to our nature and
destiny in the future? Moreover, if a
court is to ascribe insanity to a man, or
a class of men constituting a sect, on
account of his or their opinion or belief
as to a future state, and a particular sect
had in fact attained to a real knowledge
of that future, the logical deduction
would necessarily be that a major portion
of mankind, comprised in all other and
different sects, were of unsound mind or
monomaniacs on that subject. If it be
the case that such knowledge has been so
attained by a sect or known body of
believers, the question remains which it
is, and what tribunal is to exercise the
judgment of determination."
An insane man may ratify his contract
and his ratification may be inferred:
Arnold v. Richnwnd Iron Works, I Gray
434; Eato,, v. Eaton, 8 Vroom 503;
Tucker v. Mforeland, 10 Pet. 64.
To set aside a contract made on a
valuable consideration, the sane party
must have had notice of the other's insanity: Ashcroft v. DeArmond, 44 Iowa
229; Campbell v. Hill, 22 U. C. C. P.
526; 23 Id. 473.
" The law does not attempt to determine the degree of intelligence that parties must possess to bind themselves by
contract. A party is presumed to have
legal competency to contract when lie is
in the possession of mental capacity, sufficient to transact business with intelligence and an understanding of what he
is doing. Persons who have lost their
memory and understanding by old age,
sickness, or other accident or infirmity,
to such a degree that they are rendered
incapable of transacting their business
and of managing their property, are considered to be of unsound mind. A deed
may be avoided on the ground of insanity,
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when the grantor did not possess sufficient strength of mind and reason to
understand the nature and consequences
of his act in executing it, and by its
execution he does not make it his deed,
if at the time, he was from weakness of
mind incapable of understanding it if
explained to him. But although it may
be uncertain that the mind of the grantor
was in all respects sound, still, if he has
sufficient ability to execute and deliver a
deed, understanding the consideration he
is to receive, and the nature of the transaction in transferring his title to another,
it is considered that his mind is sufficiently sound to render his deed valid:"
I Devlin on Deeds, sects. 67, 68.
The grantor is to be deemed sane if he
has sufficient mental ability to comprehend what he is doing and to understand
the nature of his act: Wright v. Jackson,
59 Wis. 569 ; 1 Devlin on Deeds, sect.
69.
Mere nervous excitement existing in the
grantor"s mind at the time of the execution of the deed will not invalidate him:
1 Devlin on Deeds, sect. 70.
For the purpose of showing insanity,
evidence as to the condition of a party's
mind immediately before, at, and after
the execution of the contract or conveyance is admissible : Peaslee v. Robbins,
3 Met. 164; Grant v. Tiompson, 4
Conn. 203 ; 10 Am. Dec. 119; Dickinsun v. Barber, 9 Mass. 225; 6 Am.
Dec. 58; Wfatson v. Anderson, 11 Ala.
43; Hendrix v. Mooney, I Bush 306.
But evidence cannot be admitted to

show insanity at remote periods befoc
or after the making of the conveyance:
Barden v. Hays, 14 Penn. St. 91.
A deed will not be avoided on account
of the mere mental weakness of the
grantor, if such weakness does not
amount to inability to comprehend the
contract and there is no evidence of
undue influence or imposition: Miller v.
Craig, 36 Ill. 109 ; VanHorn v. Keenan,
28 Id. 488; Aiman v. Stout, 42 Penn.
St. 114.
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The deed of an insane person not
under guardianship transfers a seisin,
and is merely voidable; and if executed
during a lucid interval, it cannot be successfully assailed on the ground of the
anterior or subsequent insanity: 1 Devlin
oti Deeds, sect. 73; Riggan v. Greene,
80 N. C. 236 ; Breckenridge v. Omnsby,
I J. J. Marsh. 236; 19 Am. Dcc. 71;
Cates v. Woodson, 2 Dana 452 ; Ingraham v. Baldwin, 5 Seld. 45 ; Arnold v.
R ich nond Iron Works, 1 Gray 434 ;
Allis v. Billings, 6 Met. 415 ; 39 Am.
Dec. 744; Freed v. Brown, 55 Ind.
310 ; Jackson v. Gumaer, 2 Cowen 552 ;
Crouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. 30 ; Pricey.
Berrington, 3 Macn. & G. 486 ; Desilver's
Estate, 5 Rawle lI t ; 28 Am. Dec.
645; Bensell v. Chancellor, 5 Whart.
376 ; 34 Am. Dec. 561 ; Beals v. See,
10 Penn. St. 56; 49 Am. Dec. 573;
Seaver v. Phelps, 11 Pick. 304 ; Thomas
v. Hatch, 3 Sum. 170; Key v. Davis,
1 Mo. 32 ; Baton v. Eaton, 8 Vroom
103; Somers v. Pumphrey, 24 Ind. 231
Tucker v. Moreland, 10 Peters 58;
Harden v. Hays, 14 Penn. St. 91.
A deed may be rescinded by the
grantor himself when restored to reason,
or by his executor, administrator, committee, guardian or his heirs: Key v.
Davis, I Md. 32; Judge of Probate v.
Stone, 44 N. H. 593; Campbell v. Kuhn,
45 Mich. 513; Cates v. lVoodson, 2
Dana 452; Brown v. Freed, 43 Ind.
253.

But strangers and persons who are
merely the privies in estate of the grantor
have not the right of avoiding a voidable
deed: 1 Devlin on Deeds, sect. 75 ;
Kibbe v. Myrick, 12 Fla. 419 ; Breckenridge v. Ormsby, 1 J. J. Marsh. 236,
248; 19 Am. Dec. 71. Butsee Thomas
v. Hatch, 3 Sum. 170.

"There isnot au unanimity of opinion
on the question as to the necessity of
restoring the purchase-money and placing
the grantee in the same position that he
occupied before the execution of the deed,
in cases where the grantee acted without

notice of the grantor's insanity and in
good faith. On the one hand, it is held
in such a case, the grantee should receive
what he has paid out, before a deed
made to him acting in good faith by an
insane grantor should be set aside. But
on the other band, it is held that the
right of avoidance exists against bona
fide purchasers without notice, and that
io previous offer of restitution is necessary. The true rule would seem to be
that only in cases of fraud should the
deed be set aside without return of the
consideration, but in cases where the
deed was taken in good faith, the grantee should be remembered :" I Devlin
on Deeds, sect. 76.
The suggestion of mere weakness or
indiscretion in the contracting party is
not sufficient to set aside a conveyance
on the ground of undue influence. It
must also be shown that undue means
were used to control that weakness.
Though fraud may be shown, it does not
follow, in equity, as a necessary consequence, that a conveyance must be set
aside absolutely. Effect may be given
to it by allowing it to remain as security
for whatever amount may have been
actually due by one party to the other:
Anthony v. Hutchins, 10 R. 1. 165.
"Deeds made under undue influence,
like those obtained by duress, are voidable. Influence exerted over a grantor
to such a degree as to deprive him of the
exercise of his will, is in equity, considered a fraud, and a conveyance obtained thereby will be set aside. The
burden of proving undue influence is
upon the person alleging it; and as each
case must for the most part be decided
by its own peculiar circumstances, the
relations between the parties should be
taken into consideration in determining
whether the grantor was acting under
undue influence. Less evidence is necessary to establish the use of undue influence, to obtain the execution of a deed,
when relations of trust and confidence,
as parent and child, guardian and ward,

BARHOLT v. WRIGHT.
trustee and beneficiary, attorney and
client, physician and patient, nurse and
invalid exist, than might be required in
other cases :" 1Devlin on Deeds, see.
84.
Judge FIELD says that it may be stated
as settled law, "that whenever there is
a great weakness of mind in a person
executing a conveyance of land, arising
from age, sickness, or any other cause,
though not amounting to absolute disqualification, and the consideration given
for the property is grossly inadequate, a
court of equity will, upon proper and

seasonable application of the injured
party, or his representatives or heirs,
interfere and set the conveyance aside :"
Allore v. Jewdl, 94 U. S. 506, 511.
A leading case on the subject of the
avoidance of contracts between a believer
in spiritualism and a professed medium
is Lyon v. Bome, L. R., 6 Eq. 655.
Other cases to like effect are Nottidge v.
Prince, 2 Giff. 2456, and T7iompson v.
Hawcks, 14 Fed. Rep. 902.
RoBEnT T. DEvIiN.
Sacramento, Cal.

Supreme Court of Ohio.
BARHOLT v. WRIGHT.
It is no defence to an action for assault and battery that the acts complained of
were committed in a fight engaged in by mutual consent, although such consent may
be shown in mitigation of damages.
A civil action for assault and battery may be maintained although the assault and
battery were committed in the course of a fight engaged in by the mutual consent
of plaintiff and defendant. The fact that the fight, in which the injuries complained
of, took place, was by consent, can be shown in mitigation of damages.
ERR R to Circuit Court, Portage county.
Action for assault and battery. The evidence showed that plaintiff and defendant went out to fight by agreement, and did fight,
and plaintiff was severely injured; one of his fingers being so
bitten, among other things, that it had to be amputated. The
court charged that, if the parties fought by agreement, plaintiff
could not recover, and a verdict was returned for defendant.. Upon
error to the Circuit Court a new trial was ordered; defendant now
brings error to reverse that order.

-P. B. Conant and T .B. NSichols, for plaintiff in error.

W. B. Thomas and Geo. _. Robinson, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MINSHALL, J.-It would seem at first blush contrary to certain
general principles of remedial justice to allow a plaintiff to recover
damages for an injury inflicted on him by a defendant in a combat

of his own seeking ; or where, as in this case, the fight occurred
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by an agreement between the parties to fight. Thus, in cases for
damages resulting from the clearest negligence on the part of the
defendant, a recovery is denied the plaintiff if it appear that his
own fault in any way contributed to the injury of which he complains. And a maxim, as old as the law, volenti non fit injuria,
forbids a recovery by a plaintiff where it appears that the ground
of his complaint had been induced by that to which be had
assented ; for, in judgment of law, that to which a party assents is
not deemed an injury. Broom Leg. Max. 268.
But as often as the question has been presented, it has been
decided that a recovery may be had by a plaintiff for injuries
inflicted by the defendant in a mutual combat, as well as in a combat where the plaintiff was the first assailant, and the injuries
resulted from the use of excessive and unnecessary force by the
defendant in repelling the assault. These apparent anomalies rest
upon the importance which the law attaches to the public peace as
well as to the life and person of the citizen. From considerations
of this kind it no more regards an agreement by which one man
may have assented to be beaten than it does an agreement to
part with his liberty, and become the slave of another. But the
fact that the injuries were received in a combat in which the parties
had engaged by mutual agreement may be shown in mitigation of
damages: 2 Greenl. Ev. § 85; Logan v. Austin, 1 Stew. 476.
This, however, is the full extent to which the cases have gone. We
will notice a few of them.
In Boulter v. Clark, an early case, an offer was made, under the
general issue, to show that the plaintiff and the defendant fought by
consent. The offer was denied, the chief baron saying: "The
fight being unlawful, the consent of the plaintiff to fight, if proved,
would be no bar to his action." Bull. N. P. 16.
A number of earlier cases were cited, and among them that of
Matthew v. Ollerton, Comb. 218, where it is said, "that if a man
license another to beat him, such license is void, because it is
against the peace." It will be found upon examination that this
case was not for an assault and battery; it was on an award that
had been made by the plaintiff on a submission to himself. The
remark, however, made in the reasoning of the court, is evidence
of the common understanding of the law at that early day.
In 1 Steph. N. P. 211, it is said: "If two men engage in a boxing match, an action can be sustained by either of them against the
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other, if an assault be made; because the act of boxing is unlawful,
and the consent of the parties to fight cannot excuse the injury."
So in Bell v. ffansley, 3 Jones (N. C.) 131, it was held that
"9one may recover in an action for assault and battery, although he
agreed to fight with his adversary ; for, such agreement to break
the peace being void, the maxim volenti non fit injuria does not
apply." The following cases are to the same effect: Stout v.
Wren, I Hawks 420; Adams v. Waggoner, 33 Ind. 531 ; Shay
v. Thompson, 59 Wis. 540, 18 N. W. Rep. 473; Logan v. Austin,
1 Stew. 476.
And so it was held in Com. v. Collberg, 119 Mass. 350, that
where two persons go out to fight with their fists, by consent, and
do fight with each other, each is guilty of an assault, although
there is no anger or mutual ill-will. Champer v. State, 14 Ohio
St. 437, is not in conflict with this, as will be explained hereafter.
No case has been cited that can be said to be to the contrary.
What is said by PECK, J., in Smith v. State, 12 Ohio St. 466,
that, "an assault upon a consenting party would seem to be a legal
absurdity," must be applied to the facts of that case. The judge
was discussing the sufficiency of a count in an indictment for
an assault with an intent to commit a rape, without an averment
that it was made forcibly and against the will of the female. The
absence of consent is essential to the crime of rape, or of an
assault with intent to commit a rape, where the female has arrived
at the age at which consent may be given. Intercourse, because
illicit, does not amount to an assault, where the female consents,
however wrong it may be in morals. This was all that was meant
by the learned judge in using the language quoted from his opinion.
In all such cases the consent of the female would, without doubt,
be a bar to any right she would otherwise have to maintain an
action for an assault and battery. It is said by Judge COOLEY,
in his work on Torts 161, that " consent is generally a full and
perfect shield when that is complained of as a civil injury which
was consented to. * * * A man may not even complain of the
adultery of his wife which he connived at or assented to. If he
concurs in the dishonor of his bed, the law will not give him redress,
because he is not wronged. These cases are plain enough, because
they are cases in which -the questions arise between the parties
alone." "But," he adds, "in case of a breach of the peace it is
different. The state is wronged by this, and forbids it on public
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grounds. * * * The rule of law is therefore clear and unquestionable that consent to an assault is .no justification. The exception
to this general rule embraces only those cases in which that to
which assent is given is matter of indifference to public order."
Neither is the case of Okamper v. State, suTpra, at variance with the principle upon which the plaintiff below seeks a
recovery. The case seems to have been somewhat misapprehended
by the courts of some of the states, as well as by some text-writers.
By the statutes of this state a distinct offence is made of an affray
or agreement to fight; and the effect of the holding is that where
such an offence is committed the indictment must be for an affray,
and not for an assault and battery. The civil right of either party
to recover of the other for injuries received in an affray is not
affected by the statute, nor by the decision just referred to. Such
seems to have been the view taken by BOYNTON, J., in the subsequent case of Darling v. Williams, 35 Ohio St. 63.
The case of Fitzgeraldv. Cavin, 110 Mass. 153, is to the effect
that consent is no bar to that which occasions bodily harm, if the
act was intentionally done.
It is upon the same principle of public policy that one who is the
first assailant in a fight may recover of his antagonist for injuries
inflicted by the latter, where he oversteps what is reasonably necessary to his defence, and unnecessarily injures the plaintiff; or that,
with apparent want of inconsistency, permits each to bring an
action in such case, the assaulted party for the assault first committed upon him, and the assailant for the excess of force used
beyond what was necessary for self-defence: Dole v. irskine, 35
N. H. 503; criticising Elliott v. Brown, 2 Wend. 499 ; Cooley
Torts 165 ; Darlingv. Williams, 85 Ohio St. 63 ; GCizler v. Witzel,
82 Ill. 322. And see, also, Com. v. 0ollberg, supra.
It would seem that under the Code the right of each combatant
to damages might be determined and measured in the same action.
Swan, P1. Prec. 259, n. a.
And upon like principle it has been ruled that .the doctrine of
contributory negligence has no application to an action to recover.
damages for an assault and battery: Buter v. Foy, 46 Iowa 182;'
Steinmetz v. Kelly/, 72 Ind. 442; Whitehead v. .lathaway, 85
Ind. 85. Negligence of the plaintiff contributing to the injury of
which he complains is taken into consideration only in those cases
where the liability of the defendant arises from want of care on his
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part, occasioning injury to the plaintiff; it does not apply to the
commission of an intentional wrong.
A question was made as to the admissibility of the evidence of
an agreement to fight under the issue made by the pleadings, the
answer being a general denial. If the evidence had been competent
for any purpose, other than in mitigation of damages, it would have
been under the issue as made. It was insisted on in denial of the
right of action, and not as an avoidance of it; so that it was not
necessary to be pleaded as new matter. If it had been so pleaded
it would have been subject to a demurrer. We think the court
erred in its charge to the jury. The injury inflicted, the loss of a
finger, was a severe one; it amounted in fact to a mayhem. "Where
the injury," (a mayhem) says the author of a recent and quite
valuable work on Criminal Procedure, "takes place during a conflict, it is not necessary to a conviction that the accused should have
formed the intent before engaging in the conflict. It is sufficient
if he does the act voluntarily, unlawfully, and on purpose." Maxw.
Orim. Proc. 260. It was permissible to the defendant to show the
agreement to fight in mitigation of damages, but not as a bar to the
action.
Judgment affirmed.
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